

# Summary Report

Collision

*Sinbad 6 & Double Agent*

3 July 2006



## NARRATIVE



**Photograph 1**  
***Sinbad 6***

On 2 July 2006 at approximately 2100, ***Sinbad 6*** departed Sandspit bound for Bon Accord Harbour, Kawai Island. The only person on the vessel was the Skipper. His intentions were to deliver a 20 litre drum of fuel to a friend's yacht later that evening, but to first go to his home in Stockyard Bay, Bon Accord Harbour. ***Sinbad 6*** arrived at the pier near the Skipper's home at approximately 2130 and the Skipper went home to prepare for the following day's study at college. After managing to make contact with his friend via cell phone and arranging to meet at Vivian Bay, the Skipper left home at approximately 2300.

After a voyage lasting approximately 10 minutes, ***Sinbad 6*** arrived in Vivian Bay (See Figure 1 – *Chartlet of Vivian Bay*) and moored port side alongside the anchored yacht, ***Seeker***, on its starboard side. At this time, ***Seeker*** was heading in a broadly north easterly direction.

The Skipper of ***Sinbad 6*** helped his friend refuel the yacht and bleed the fuel system, after which they ate a meal, played cards and drank some beer.

At approximately midnight, ***Sinbad 6*** was cast off from the yacht and the Skipper commenced his return passage to Bon Accord Harbour. His initial course on leaving the yacht was in a north easterly direction, parallel to the shore. The Skipper knew of two unlit vessels that were always moored in Vivian Bay (See Figure 1), and he trained ***Sinbad 6's*** searchlight onto these two vessels to ensure he kept clear of them. As there were apparently no other vessels in the vicinity, the Skipper increased speed and started to turn to port onto a westerly heading to exit the Bay. Shortly afterwards, as the vessel's speed was still increasing, ***Sinbad 6*** collided with an anchored vessel, ***Double Agent***. It is believed that ***Sinbad 6*** would have been travelling at approximately 15 knots at the time of the collision.

The force of the collision knocked the Skipper off his chair. As soon as he stood up, he realized that he had been involved in a collision. **Sinbad 6** had ridden up over the transom of **Double Agent** and was clear of the water. The Skipper immediately jumped onto **Double Agent** and checked for any possible casualties. He found the vessel to be unmanned. The Skipper then telephoned his company's Designated Person Ashore (DPA) who arrived at the scene in another vessel within approximately 15 minutes. **Sinbad 6** floated off **Double Agent** and the Skipper ascertained that there was no hull damage causing water ingress

The Skipper of **Sinbad 6** manually retrieved the anchor of **Double Agent** and she was towed into shallow water to prevent her sinking. One of the vessel's twin hulls was already flooding and the vessel was towed until she touched bottom. She eventually settled in the water on an even keel.




Figure 1  
Chartlet of Vivian Bay

# FINDINGS

There were no eye witnesses to the collision.

The weather conditions were good, with little wind and calm seas. Visibility was good. The sky was partly overcast.

The owner of **Double Agent** heard the collision and rowed from ashore to the scene of the accident. He stated that **Double Agent** had been displaying an all round white light as required for a vessel at anchor under **Maritime Rule Part 22.30**, as well as two all round solar powered lights that were at the stern. It is thought these solar lights were of the type used to mark garden paths and consequently of low luminosity. The Skipper of **Sinbad 6** and the Skipper of **Seeker** stated that **Double Agent** was not displaying an all round white light as required by the Rule.

The Skipper of **Sinbad 6** did not see **Double Agent** until the collision. He is of the opinion that **Sinbad 6** approached **Double Agent** from an angle of approximately 45° off its port bow and collided with **Double Agent's** port quarter. Examination of the damage sustained by **Double Agent**, however, appears to conflict with this theory as the majority of the damage was on the starboard quarter of the vessel. Due to the lack of witnesses, it is uncertain what the exact heading of **Double Agent** would have been at the time of the collision. However, if she was lying in the same direction as **Seeker**, which was also at anchor, then an initial heading of north east by **Sinbad 6** followed by a turn to port, would support a collision with **Double Agent's** starboard quarter. The collision occurred at slack water.

The Skipper of **Sinbad 6** stated that he consumed only two cans of beer prior to the collision.

**Sinbad 6's** radar was not running at the time of the collision. The radar was in stand-by mode. The Skippers intention was to run the radar once clear of the anchorage as this was his normal practice. At the time of the collision, there were no instructions from the company to their Masters regarding the use of radars.

The Skipper of **Sinbad 6** was well rested at the time of the accident.

The Skipper of **Sinbad 6** normally navigates in and out of Vivian Bay on at least a daily basis and is familiar with the positions of various anchored and moored vessels. At the time of the accident, the Skipper was only working weekends as he was studying at the Maritime College for his Offshore Master's Certificate of Competency. He had not been to Vivian bay for at least a week prior to the accident. **Double Agent** had anchored after the Skipper had last been to Vivian Bay.

It is not known exactly how far off the shore **Double Agent** was anchored at the time of the collision. From the evidence available, however, it is believed to have been approximately 150 metres from the nearest land.

It is believed that **Double Agent** was anchored approximately 150 metres to the north east of **Seeker**.

It is possible that the Skipper's night vision had not had time to adjust fully since leaving the brightly lit cabin of **Seeker**.

The Skipper of **Sinbad 6** was sitting at the steering consol on the starboard side of the vessel from where there is good visibility.

The maximum speed of **Sinbad 6** is approximately 27 knots.

The Skipper of **Sinbad 6** suffered minor injuries as a result of the collision.

**Sinbad 6** sustained minor damage as a result of the accident.

**Double Agent** was extensively damaged. She was later salvaged and repaired.



**Photograph 2**  
***Double Agent*** after the accident

**Maritime Rule 22.5 - Lookout** states:

*Every vessel must at all times maintain a proper lookout by sight and hearing as well as all available means appropriate in the prevailing circumstances and conditions, so as to make full appraisal of the situation and the risk of collision.*

**Maritime Rule 22.6 - Safe Speed** states:

*Every vessel must at all times proceed at a safe speed so that proper and effective action to avoid a collision can be taken and the vessel can be stopped within a distance appropriate to the prevailing circumstances and conditions.*

In determining a safe speed, the following factors must be among those taken into account:

For all vessels-

- (a) the state of visibility
- (b) the traffic density, including concentrations of fishing vessels or any other vessels.
- (c) The manoeuvrability of the vessel , with special reference to stopping distance and turning ability in the prevailing conditions.
- (d) At night the presence of background light such as from shore lights or from the back scatter of the vessels own lights
- (e) The state of wind, sea and current, and the proximity of navigational hazards.
- (f) The draught in relation to the available depth and width of navigable water.

Additionally, for vessels fitted with operational radar -

- (a) the characteristics, efficiency and limitations of the radar equipment.
- (b) any constraints imposed by the radar range scale in use.
- (c) the effect on radar of the sea state, weather, and other sources of interference.
- (d) the possibility that small vessels, ice and other floating objects may not be detected by radar at an adequate range.
- (e) The number, location and movement of vessels detected by radar.
- (f) The more exact assessment of the visibility that may be possible when radar is used to determine the range of vessels or other objects in the vicinity .

In this accident, it would have been appropriate to use the vessel's radar, but it was not used.

The Skipper breached the Auckland Regional Navigational By-law which prohibits vessels from exceeding 5 knots within 200 metres of the shore or 50 metres of another vessel.

**Section 3.2 (1) of the Auckland Regional Council Navigation Safety Bylaws 2000**, states as follows:

*"No person may propel or navigate a vessel (including a vessel towing someone or some object) at a proper speed exceeding 5 knots:*

- (a) within 50 metres of any other vessel, raft, or person on the water; or*
- (b) within either 200 metres of the shore or of any structure, or on the inshore side of any row of buoys demarcating that distance from the shore or structure; or*
- (c) within 200 metres of any vessel or raft that is flying Flag A of the International Code of Signals; or*
- (d) within 200 metres of an area designated by a harbourmaster."*



**Photograph 3**  
*Double Agent* after being salvaged.

## SAFETY RECOMMENDATIONS

It is recommended that the Skipper of **Sinbad 6** be censured for failing to keep a proper lookout and failing to proceed at a safe speed.

## VESSEL DETAILS

<b>Ship Name:</b>	<b><i>Sinbad 6</i></b>
<b>Ship Type:</b>	Restricted Passenger Ship
<b>Flag:</b>	New Zealand
<b>Built:</b>	2005
<b>Construction Material:</b>	Glass reinforced plastic
<b>Length Overall (m):</b>	7.3
<b>Registered Owner:</b>	Reuben Zylstra
<b>Ship Operator/Manager:</b>	Reubens Water Taxi
<b>SSM Company:</b>	Survey Nelson
<b>Accident Investigator:</b>	Andrew Hayton