Lookout! – issue 14, September 2009

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The sailing yacht capsized after its keel became
detached from its hull.

After the keel failed, the yacht lay on its side with the mast and mainsail in the water. The two crew had time to send a mayday message on their VHF radio, activate their EPIRB, and don lifejackets before the yacht completely capsized. It was at least an hour before sunrise, and they were 11 nautical miles from the safety of the harbour they were headed to.

Unable to clamber onto the hull, and wearing what is believed to have been an incorrectly fitted lifejacket, the vessel’s skipper drowned before help could arrive.

The vessel’s crewmember had tried to assist the skipper, but became exhausted. He was kept afloat by his correctly donned lifejacket, and was later able to scramble onto the slippery hull to await rescue.

The 12.5 metre three-quarter rig racing yacht had been built to a one-off design, and had been fitted with a new “Z-keel” in 2000. In 2006, the vessel had struck a whale. The rudder had been lost and the keel bulb damaged. Later checks showed a crack in the fairing, where the keel attached to the keel plate.

The yacht on a traditional cradle, showing the
“Z-keel” design.

Some weeks before the accident the vessel was slipped in a travel lift, which allowed the keel to hang freely. The keel was showing sideways movement and vibrating. After discussions with the boat’s designer, the crew decided to tighten the keel bolts and to voyage to a major port for repairs.

Most of the journey passed without incident. The vessel handled moderate seas, a short squall, and a period of motor sailing in calm conditions. As the vessel neared its destination, the crewmember was below navigating, while the skipper was at the helm.

In the early hours of the morning of the capsize, the crewmember felt the vessel suddenly slow down to about 4 knots. He joined the skipper on deck, and checked overboard with a torch, but neither man could see anything unusual. The vessel held her track for a further 100 metres, and then rolled onto her port side with her mainsail lying on the surface of the sea.

The men donned type 401 coastal lifejackets, manually activated the vessel’s emergency beacon and attempted a mayday call on a hand-held VHF radio from within the cabin.

Unfortunately they were not able to pass on any position information owing to very poor reception. Neither man could get his cellphone to work, but they managed to fire distress flares. The vessel’s liferaft had been stowed below under a table, to keep it out of the way. Once the vessel rolled, the men could not reach it.

As the mast filled with water and lost buoyancy, the yacht rolled upside down. The skipper managed to get out of the cabin, but the crewmember struggled for some time before managing to get clear.

Once in the water, both men tried to climb on the vessel’s hull, but could not. The skipper’s lifejacket repeatedly slipped over his head, and efforts from the crewmember to tighten the straps could not secure it. The skipper eventually succumbed to cold and exhaustion and drowned. The other man was later spotted by air, and rescued by a Coastguard vessel.

More information and resources

31 August 2008: Capsize of Time To Burn with the loss of one life near Tauranga harbour
Accident report number 08 1486 [PDF: 1MB, 36 pages]

LOOKOUT! POINTS

1. The vessel’s first emergency beacon, although operating on the 406 MHz frequency, was not of the GPS type that immediately provides co-ordinates of the vessel’s location. It took more than an hour for a second satellite pass that gave the Rescue Coordination Centre New Zealand a usable position. It was about 2 hours before rescuers reached the men.
   
   Having the means to provide an accurate position as soon as possible can be the difference between life and death in cold waters. An emergency beacon that relays position co-ordinates, and a hand-held, waterproof type VHF radio are invaluable. A mast mounted radio aerial is useless in the event of a capsize or if the mast breaks.
2. Although the vessel was overall wellequipped with safety gear, stowing the liferaft under a table meant it could not be reached when the vessel capsized. Liferafts should be stowed for immediate access.
3. The vessel had plenty of lifejackets, but it appears that in his rush and darkness, the skipper had not correctly donned his. If his arms were not properly positioned through the straps, the lifejacket would have been likely to repeatedly slip over his head.
4. Deciding to set sail in a vessel with a known keel defect had tragic consequences. The men could have trucked the vessel by road, or removed the mast and motored the vessel to the repair yard with additional ballast to improve its stability, should the keel be lost.

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