



# Accident Report

*Ken Un*

Serious Injury at Port of  
Tauranga on 31 July 2004



REPORT NO.: 96 295  
VESSEL NAME: *KEN UN*

### Casualty Details:

Date of Casualty: 31 July 2004  
Time of Casualty: 0338 hours New Zealand Standard Time (NZST)  
Casualty Type: Serious Injury  
Casualty Location: Port of Tauranga  
Weather Forecast Area: Plenty  
Date MSA Notified: 31 July 2004  
Investigator: Hei Cheung & David Billington



REPORT NO.: 96 295

VESSEL NAME: *KEN UN*

### Vessel Details:

Ship Name:	<i>Ken Un</i>
Date of Build:	1996
Ship Category:	Bulk Carrier
Certified Operating Limit:	International
Overall Length (m):	154.35
Gross Tonnage:	14 743
Flag:	Panama
Ship Manager:	Inui Steamship Co. Ltd, Japan
Classification Society:	NKK



## SUMMARY

At about 0338 hours New Zealand Standard Time (NZST) on 31 July 2004, an Able seaman (AB) onboard the Bulk Carrier *Ken Un* sustained head and back injuries.

The injuries were caused in port whilst working cargo; the AB lost his balance whilst walking on an unsecured load of logs, which were loaded on the vessel's No. 2 cargo hatch.

As a result, he fell overboard and landed in between the vessel and the quay. At the time of the accident, the AB was not wearing protective clothing.



# 1. Key Events

- 1.1 On 29 July 2004, at about 0915 hours New Zealand Standard Time (NZST), *Ken Un* arrived at Tauranga after completing her sea voyage from Japan. The vessel berthed port side to Mt Maunganui Wharf, berth No. 10, to load a cargo of logs.
- 1.2 On 31 July 2004, at about 0330 hours, the loading of the log cargo in No. 1 hold was completed. The International Stevedore Operation's (ISO) Supervisor instructed the Second Officer to close the hatch on No. 1 cargo hold.
- 1.3 The Second Officer climbed onto No 2 cargo hatch, which was loaded with logs, in preparation for securing the load. He observed three ordinary-seamen (OS) had just finished putting separation marks on the logs on deck No. 4. He used hand signals to attract the attention of one of the ordinary seamen and then instructed him to tell Able Seaman (AB) to proceed to No. 1 hold.
- 1.4 At about 0335 hours, the AB woke the Chief Officer he told him that the No. 2 deck cargo of logs was almost ready for centre lashing. The AB met OS Cahate by the gangway and was told that the Second Officer wanted him to go to No. 1 hatch.
- 1.5 At about 0338 hours, the AB was walking on the logs loaded on No. 2 hatch at a distance of approximately 1.5 metres from the port stanchions. As he approached the fore end of the hatch one of the logs moved and then rolled causing the AB to lose his balance. He fell overboard between the concrete wharf and ship's side and onto a wooden fender, on the facing side of the wharf.
- 1.6 While the AB was falling, he attempted unsuccessfully to grab a span wire that was attached to one of the collapsible stanchions. He fell about five metres. He managed to stop the fall by using both his arms.
- 1.7 The ISO Stevedores, who saw the AB falling overboard, helped him out of the gap. They placed him in a comfortable position awaiting the arrival of the ambulance.
- 1.8 At about 0350 hours, the ambulance arrived and the AB was given first aid before being transferred to Tauranga Hospital for further medical examination and treatment. He received six stitches to his forehead and diagnosed with bruising to his head and back.
- 1.9 At about midday the AB was discharged from hospital and returned to the ship. He was advised by the hospital doctor to rest, while the ship was on passage to Nelson, where he would be re-examined by a doctor to decide whether he would be medically fit to continue his duties onboard.



## 2. Key Conditions

- 2.1 **Ken Un**, IMO number 9135468, is a bulk carrier, registered in Panama. Her gross tonnage is 14 743 tonnes and her overall length is 154.35 metres. The vessel is classed with NKK and managed by Inui Steamship co. Ltd. of Japan.
- 2.2 The vessel was built in 1996. **Ken Un** is a regular visitor to Tauranga.
- 2.3 The AB stated that he commenced his career at sea in 1987. He had worked on four other log ships previously. He joined **Ken Un** on 21 April 2004. This was his third voyage onboard.
- 2.4 The AB stated that while the vessel was loading logs in Tauranga, he was on 12 to 4 shift. On 30 July, he finished his day work at 1600 hours and then went to sleep at 1730 hours after dinner. He woke at about 2300 hours in order to get ready for his 12 to 4 night shift. He said, he had a good sleep and was well rested.
- 2.5 When he was walking on deck he did not wear any spiked shoes or a hard/safety hat.

## 3. Contributing Factors

*N.B. These are not listed in order of importance.*

- 3.1 The AB was walking on an unstable log cargo.
- 3.2 The AB was not wearing spiked shoes, and it would appear that he was walking too close to the outside of the ship, which gave him little room to react when he lost his balance.



## 4. Cause

### Human Factor

- |   |  |  |
|---|--|--|
| <input type="checkbox"/> Failure to comply with regulations         | <input type="checkbox"/> Drugs & Alcohol               | <input type="checkbox"/> Overloading   |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Failure to obtain ships position or course | <input type="checkbox"/> Fatigue                       | <input type="checkbox"/> Physiological |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Improper watchkeeping or lookout           | <input type="checkbox"/> Lack of knowledge             | <input type="checkbox"/> Ship Handling |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Misconduct/Negligence                      | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Error of judgement | <input type="checkbox"/> Other . . .   |

### Environmental Factor

- |  |   |                                    |  |
|--|---|------------------------------------|--|
| <input type="checkbox"/> Adverse weather | <input type="checkbox"/> Debris           | <input type="checkbox"/> Ice       | <input type="checkbox"/> Navigation hazard |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Adverse current | <input type="checkbox"/> Submerged object | <input type="checkbox"/> Lightning | <input type="checkbox"/> Other . . .       |

### Technical Factor

- |   |   |   |
|---|---|---|
| <input type="checkbox"/> Structural failure | <input type="checkbox"/> Wear & tear            | <input type="checkbox"/> Steering failure                   |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Mechanical failure | <input type="checkbox"/> Improper welding       | <input type="checkbox"/> Inadequate firefighting/lifesaving |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Electrical failure | <input type="checkbox"/> Inadequate maintenance | <input type="checkbox"/> Insufficient fuel                  |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Corrosion          | <input type="checkbox"/> Inadequate stability   | <input type="checkbox"/> Other . . .                        |

4.1 The AB was walking on an unstable log cargo, close to the outside of the ship.



## 5. Opinions & Recommendations

- 5.1 If the AB had received a proper induction training program on joining the vessel, he should have been fully aware of the timber deck code 1991, relating to personnel protection and safety devices. *(Extract below)*

<b>Title</b>	TIMBER / Chapter 5 (5.1~5.7)
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### **CHAPTER 5 - PERSONNEL PROTECTION AND SAFETY DEVICES**

5.1 Suitable protective clothing and equipment, such as studded boots or studded overshoes and hard hats, should be provided for the protection of crew members and workers involved in loading, securing or discharging operations.

- 5.2 The AB ignored these procedures by failing to wear the appropriate protective clothing during the loading operation. It is a moot point whether the accident would have been prevented if the AB had been wearing a pair of spiked shoes. Alternatively, the wearing of a safety hat would have offered protection to the AB's forehead.

### Recommendations

- 5.3 It is recommended that the ship's Master remind all officers and crew of the importance of wearing personnel protective clothing when working cargo and the further need where possible to keep away from the ship's side at all times during cargo operations. The ship's Safety Officer is to document this at the next ship's safety committee meeting.
- 5.4 It is recommended that a copy of this report and the recommendation letter issued by Chief Investigator of Accidents dated 27 July 2004 - "**Training for Safety Working on Timber Deck Cargoes**" be sent to the ship's Master and Agents to draw their attention, to yet another long line of accidents onboard vessels loading timber cargo where ships crew and stevedores have been injured or have died. In view of this fact, it is of critical importance that all personnel working onboard this type of vessel should be properly inducted on all safety related matters, including the need to wear appropriate clothing.

